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Abstract 
How do academic ideas influence US foreign policy, under what conditions, and with 
what consequences? This article traces the rise, ‘securitisation’, and political 
consequences of democratic peace theory (DPT) in the United States by exploring the 
work of Doyle, Diamond, and Fukuyama. Ideas influence US foreign policy during/after 
crises when the policy environment permits ‘new thinking’; when they have been 
developed/mobilised through state-connected elite knowledge networks; when they are or 
appear paradigmatically congenial to foreign policy-makers’ mindsets; and when 
institutionally-embedded. The appropriation of DPT by foreign policy makers has 
categorised the world into antagonistic blocs – democratic/non-democratic, zones of 
peace/ turmoil – as the corollary to a renewed American mission to make the world 
“safer” through ‘democracy’ promotion. The roles of networked organic intellectuals – in 
universities and think tanks, for instance - were particularly important in elevating DPT 
from the academy to national security managers. 
Key Words: knowledge politics; networks; democratic peace; elites; American 
foundations  
    
 
 
How do academic ideas influence US foreign policy, under what conditions, and with 
what consequences? This article addresses these questions by tracing the transformation 
and indeed, ‘securitisation’, of democratic peace theory (DPT) in the United States from 
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an obscure social scientific finding to the “most productive” IR/political scientific theory 
(Levy, 1988; Maliniak, 2007). By appropriating DPT, US foreign policy-makers divided 
the world into antagonistic blocs of nations – democratic/non-democratic, zones of 
peace/turmoil – as the corollary of a renewed American mission to make the world 
“safer” through intervention (Ish-Shalom, 2008).  DPT functions as a means of 
intellectual integration of several well-springs of US foreign policy, from Clinton to Bush 
and Obama.  
 
The argument is advanced first by considering political circumstances, ‘paradigm’ 
compatibility, and the ‘machinery’ (networks) for ideas’ mobilisation and articulation 
with state policymakers (Hill, 1994a) and, secondly, by considering the varying forms of 
influence that academic ideas might exercise. Ideas influence US foreign policy when 
political circumstances change and the policy environment is permissive of ‘new 
thinking’ (Ikenberry, 1993: 57-86; Hill, 1994b: 14; Parmar, 2005:1-25), especially during 
and after crises; when ideas have been developed and politically mobilised through 
respected elite knowledge networks linked with the state; when those new ideas are or 
can be made to appear as paradigmatically congenial to US foreign policy-makers’ 
mindsets. Finally, ideas are influential when embedded in institutional norms (Goldstein 
and Keohane, 1993). The forms of influence of ideas also vary: some ideas gain 
conceptual influence (they change mindsets and create the intellectual conditions for 
policy change; Hill and Beshoff, 1994: 4), others may be used directly in policy-making 
and exercise instrumental influence, while still others may display symbolic influence, 
used to legitimise predetermined policies (Beyer, 1997: 17; Amara et al, 2004). DPT is 
especially interesting because it has become the intellectual rationale for America’s 
global role since 1989 (Lynch, 2009: 57; Smith, 2007).   
 
The role of organic intellectuals in each of the above processes – interpreting and 
successfully promoting to and with policy communities that a new historical 
circumstance represents a crisis/opportunity requiring new thinking and elaborating 
ideas through dense political-intellectual knowledge networks, within paradigms that 
define problems congenial to policy-maker mindsets, and which work institutionally to 
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embed and more broadly to disseminate ideas – is fundamental (Hoare and Nowell-
Smith, 1971).1 The social function of organic intellectuals is to elaborate a dominant 
ideology in order better to cohere and reproduce the capitalist order. To be sure, the 
production and mobilisation of ideas is a political process that has built-in conflict, 
especially at the level of tactical advantage-seeking behaviour vis a vis ideological-
political tendencies among ‘mainstream’ elite knowledge institutions, but also at 
effectively setting the agenda to prevent the formation of radical challenges to 
‘mainstream’ thinking and ‘debates’. Who promotes an idea or theory is important, 
therefore, as are when, how and to whom those ideas are stated (Buger and Villumsen, 
2007: 417). 
 
The article, first, considers the rapid rise of DPT through the technology of elite 
knowledge networks that are, in effect, the sites at which ‘paradigm 
compatibility/adaptability’ is developed and determined, and which are also the principal 
mechanism through which ‘new’ ideas circulate among organic intellectuals and between 
them and the state; secondly, it briefly considers how the ‘influence’ of ideas may be 
understood and empirically recognised; thirdly, it separately examines the three principal 
lines of development of DPT by exploring the work of leading liberal and neo-
conservative scholars Michael Doyle, Larry Diamond, and Francis Fukuyama; fourthly, it 
considers the role of 9-11 in bringing together previously separate tendencies favouring 
the democratic peace; finally, it moves to a Conclusion. 
 
Democratic peace theory and knowledge networks 
Democratic peace theory posits that mature democracies rarely fight wars against each 
other due to a number of key characteristics they possess, including the accountability of 
leadership to citizens, an attachment to diplomacy and negotiation rather than force, and a 
more general ‘live-and-let-live’ attitude to difference. If true, its implications are 
profound – that the spread of democracy around the globe would lead to increased US 
national security. Although the theory is widely associated with the work of Michael 
Doyle, and his particular re-reading of Immanuel Kant, it is also argued that the 
democratic peace and the concurrent rise of international liberal theory owe more to 
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republican security thinking than is usually acknowledged. The distinction is important in 
terms of the history of ideas but also, Deudney suggests, because Kantian ideas about 
‘pacific union’ – based on a series of treaties between republics – would have little in 
common with a “global alliance of democracies” that some democratic peace theorists 
see as the route to peace and security (Deudney, 2004, 2007). 
 
The ‘democratic peace’ is the underlying theoretical basis of the foreign and national 
security policies of President Barack Obama (as it was of his defeated Republican rival, 
Senator John McCain). There was a bipartisan consensus around the need for a “League” 
or “Concert of Democracies” as a key source of American national security (Carothers, 
2008). The presidencies of Clinton (1993-2001) and Bush (2001-2009) were powerfully 
influenced by the tenets of DPT. Clinton championed “democratic enlargement” and 
“democratic engagement” in the 1990s, while promoting freedom and democracy was 
pivotal to the Bush doctrine (Buckley and Singh, 2006; CSIS, 2009: v). 
 
Yet, it is also clear that within a broad consensus, there was a great deal of jockeying for 
position and competition over which foreign and national security paradigm would 
replace cold war “containment”. Indeed, Clinton’s national security adviser, Anthony 
Lake, termed the race to replace containment as the “Kennan sweepstake,” and, it must 
be noted, the NSC’s strategic approach outmuscled Warren Christopher’s state 
department’s case-by-case, ad hoc approach to foreign and national security policy 
(Brinkley, 1997). Even more than bureaucratic and personal politics, Lake’s 
promulgation of “enlargement” as the keystone of Clinton’s foreign policy also appealed 
to Republican representative, Newt Gingrich, who was especially attracted by the idea of 
expanding the parts of the world dominated by market/open democracies. Such hard-
nosed market-democracy expansionism married the neo-Wilsonian idealism of the most 
liberal elements of the Democratic foreign policy think tank community (Hames, 1994) 
and the more pragmatic and realist Lake and Clinton. This combination, Brinkley argues, 
was used to overcome hold-over ideas from the Bush administration – such as Cheney’s 
“world dominance”, Bush’s “new world order” – and Vice President Al Gore’s ideas of 
“global civilization”. Lake wanted more than a gimmick – he wanted his name to be 
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associated with nothing less than a blue print for post-cold war US foreign policy that 
would “merge strands of neo-Wilsonian idealism with hard-core neo-Morgenthauian 
realism” (Brinkley, 1997, 115). 
 
Despite the “politics”, however, the mix that Clinton/NSC/Lake/Gingrich developed 
would prove – in different hands, and at a different time - flexible enough to be radically 
reinterpreted by hard-core neoconservatives more firmly wedded to American 
preponderance and unipolarity to drive home America’s advantage. The mix of 
Wilsonian ideals and realism provided a basin of power and purpose to satisfy a range of 
ideo-political tendencies in US foreign policy politics (especially after 9-11).     
 
Knowledge production is deeply implicated in the organised power structures of 
American society. The processes of developing America’s national security state and 
global superpower have transformed, and been influenced by, the university, 
philanthropic foundation and think tank. These processes have placed at the centre of 
attention the significance of knowledge to power. Knowledge-makers are history-makers, 
according to Gramsci (Hoare and Nowell-Smith, 1971: 172): knowledge is a key 
component of a hegemonic project – a master plan for prosperity, security, and stability 
underpinned by powerful ideas. History-makers build on firm political-economic 
foundations a structure of society that ‘works’ and which mobilises behind it a wide-
ranging alliance – an historic bloc – comprising many classes, marginalising others. 
Knowledge networks, therefore, are fundamental to political and state power (Parmar, 
2004; Anderson, 2003: 5). 
 
Knowledge network refers to a system of flows (of people, money, ideas) between 
significant spaces in which are located critical masses of thinkers/activists; the spaces 
reflect a division of labour in the complex process of producing, packaging, 
disseminating and applying knowledge; spaces and flows are funded and nurtured by 
entrepreneurial catalytic groupings that see an opportunity for innovation. Knowledge 
networks, a technology of power, do not ‘create’ ideas but provide the necessary 
conditions in which creativity may take place, especially by funding time and space to 
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think through intellectual problems, ‘pure’ research which may have ‘real-world’ 
applications. Foundation networks are ‘fertilisers’ of ideas, not creators, and suppliers of 
dissemination opportunities to established knowledge (Carnegie Corporation, 1945: 17-
18). Policymakers interpret, even transmogrify, academics’ ideas in ways that that may 
distort their originators’ intentions. DPT, therefore, is an interesting case of conceptual, 
symbolic and instrumental influence of academic theories. 
  
Knowledge institutions, however, are also composed of people, not merely structures – 
scientists and engineers, as well as artists and designers, who are both inward-looking 
(pursuing ‘truth’) and outward-looking (producing usable technologies). Knowledge 
networks objectively combine creative thinkers and those most engaged with the ‘real’ 
world in spaces/milieus that are conducive to inter-disciplinarity behind a shared sense of 
mission, frameworks for innovation for specific purposes (Brown, 1999). In consequence, 
academics’ ideas may reach policy-makers though the interpretation of scholarly ideas by 
policy-makers may subvert their authors’ intentions (Russett, 2005). This may, in part, 
result from the inherent difficulty of applying broad and crudely understood concepts – 
like democratic peace – to specific cases (Jentleson, 2000). 
 
Such knowledge networks therefore include relations between philanthropic foundations 
and other knowledge institutions and between the funded institutions themselves, i.e., 
universities, think tanks, policy research institutes, government departments, professional 
academic associations, and learned (and other) journals. Network-building features 
regular organisational meetings, as well as research and policy-related events. The idea is 
to “put knowledge to work”, in the service of the east coast foreign policy 
establishment’s liberal-internationalism and globalism.2  
 
Yet, it is also the case that foundations build networks as ends in themselves because 
networks produce results by virtue of merely being constructed (i.e., due to a range of 
‘internal’ functions they perform); and secondly, because networks achieve ends other 
than those publicly stated (their ‘external’ functions). Foundation networks create frames 
of thought that cohere the network; finance spaces for the legitimisation of particular 
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types of knowledge; build careers and reputations; cohere and finance key scholars, 
policy-makers, universities, journals, professional societies; provide havens of “safe” 
ideas, strengthening some, combatting others. 
 
Influence of Ideas 
The influence of ideas on policymaking is extremely difficult to pin down. As Don 
Abelson argues, ideas cannot be contained until ready for deployment: they are in the air, 
subtly working their way in the media and the universities. Policymakers often use 
academic research to orient themselves to problems rather than directly for problem-
solving (Bulmer, 1982: 48), further complicating the matter. Yet, ideas are also 
mobilizable once developed into packaged policy devices, stressing the need for 
researching how far policymakers draw on academic studies to advance specific agendas. 
Many ideas may be in the air but few go beyond faddish adherence to become central to 
policymakers’ world-views (Abelson, 2006: xiii; 8). The influence of DPT, then, is 
discernable through the activities of key knowledge creation/mobilisation agencies such 
as think tanks, policy-oriented university institutes, foundations interested in US foreign 
policy, and key publications that cohere around key issues and debates, various sub-sets 
of America’s organic intellectuals.3 Clearly, evidence of DPT would need to be found in 
the above networks as well as in policymaking bureaucracies (Wilson, 2000). 
 
In developing an analytical framework and offering some rules of evidence to ‘test’ the 
claims made for DPT’s rise to policy influence, it is necessary briefly to reiterate those 
claims. It is argued that three key factors operated in DPT’s rise: political crises that 
demand ‘new thinking’; paradigmatic compatibility or malleability of ‘new thinking’ to 
foreign policy-makers’ mindsets or world-views; and well-developed knowledge 
networks. It is also argued that there are three types of influence that ‘new thinking’ 
might exercise: conceptual, symbolic and instrumental.  
 
What would evidence to sustain the argument above look like? It is suggested that crises 
that create demand for new thinking would be few and far between but would have large 
scale influence. Most straight-forwardly, in the context of DPT, the sudden end of the 
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Cold War, with its hardened political, intellectual and institutional boundaries, was vital 
to the elevation of DPT to policy centrality. Similarly, though somewhat secondarily, the 
terror attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, would also be expected to 
demand new thinking. The evidence of the work of three key knowledge networks 
(below) strongly suggests the importance of ‘1989’ and ‘9-11’ to DPT’s rise from relative 
academic obscurity. Paradigm compatibility or malleability are key aspects of the kinds 
of ‘new thinking’ that would be welcomed during and after catalytic events. Democracy 
promotion, which is the heavy implication of DPT, is a liberal American value – its 
principal idea - with origins deep in US history and culture, most famously in the thought 
of President Woodrow Wilson. The most problematic element of deploying ‘ideals’ in 
US foreign policy is the anxiety of appearing ‘soft’ and idealistic. The role of DPT 
entrepreneurs – especially those less attached to Kantian/soft-Wilsonianism - was 
precisely to present the theory as both idealistic and realistic: America’s values and 
strategic interests as unified, a position (objectively) shared by liberal internationalists, 
neo-conservatives and conservative nationalists.4 The problem remained, however, that 
the eventual application of democratic peace theory depended on the specific policy 
means – coercive, unilateral or diplomatic – favoured by differing networks. Neo-
conservatives’ attachment to aspects of democratic peace theory was partly inspired by 
their desire to advance national greatness and martial spirit, allied to the lofty character of 
democracy promotion. Fukuyama, it will be recalled, lamented the loss of “men with 
chests” that he feared would occur once liberal democracy’s triumph had brought 
“history” to an “end” (Fukuyama, 1992). 
 
There is, however, another ‘politics’ involved in the triumph of democratic peace theory, 
over and above arguments between Democrats, Republicans and neo-conservatives. And 
that lies in the almost inevitable process of transforming an idea into policy technology in 
a specific elite political culture. A peace theory, in the hands of national security 
managers, and their security-conscious think tank supporters – such as at the Democrats’ 
Progressive Policy Institute – is inevitably destined to be ‘securitised’. That is politics too 
and normally explains why the relationship between intellectuals and policy makers is, in 
the words of Robert Merton, “nasty, brutish and short” (Merton cited in Coser, 1965). 
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Politics, therefore, is not only inherent where there is observable conflict or overt 
opposition: it is inherent in the very process by which strategic policy elites, with the help 
of policy entrepreneurs, transform a theory into policy (Smith, 2007).   
 
  
 
The influence of elite knowledge networks that mobilised DPT may be recognised in a 
number of ways: conceptual and instrumental influence may be discerned in evidence 
suggesting changes to policymakers’ thinking and actual policy innovation. To ‘test’ the 
argument, this paper examines the uses of DPT by the Clinton administration, especially 
its promulgation of ‘democratic enlargement’ and, later, ‘democratic engagement’. 
Conceptually, it must be shown that US national security concepts changed from Cold 
War defensive containment to activism; instrumentally, such conceptual changes should 
be visible in policy statements and actions. DPT should also redraw foreign policy-
makers’ “map of global security” (Buger and Villumsen 2007: 434). DPT is compatible 
with most, if not all, of the major ideo-political tendencies in elite political circles in the 
United States. Therefore, its influence may be seen in the activities of liberal 
internationalists (Michael Doyle, Larry Diamond, the latter being close to the Clinton 
administration and its think tank, the Progressive Policy Institute) but also neo-
conservatives (like Francis Fukuyama) and conservative nationalists like President 
George W. Bush and his secretary of state, Condoleeza Rice. Symbolic influence may be 
discerned by the transformation of an idea into policies strongly at variance with the 
ultimate aims of the idea’s originators. In this regard, a ‘peace’ theory has clearly been 
‘securitised’, transmutated into a theory that justifies military intervention and forcible 
regime change (Ish-Shalom, 2008; Hayes, 2009).5  
 
DPT: Three Lines of Development 
DPT provides democracy promotion intellectual legitimacy. Contrary to claims of a neo-
conservative monopoly of ‘new’ thinking (and of their takeover of the Bush 
administration) over the past decade or so (Ish-Shalom, 2008; Parmar, 2009), this article 
explores three lines of development in the origins, development and rise to scientific law 
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and established political practice of DPT: first, the work of Ford (and, later, MacArthur) 
Foundation-funded Princeton scholar, Michael Doyle, in the 1980s, and leads to 
significant theoretical re-orientations among liberal internationalist IR scholars and the 
“democratic engagement” orientations of the second Clinton administration (1997-2001). 
The second line of development encompasses the work of Larry Diamond, the Hoover 
Institution scholar closely associated with the Democrats’ Progressive Policy Institute 
and the “democratic enlargement” agenda of the first Clinton administration, as well as 
the Council of the Community of Democracies. The third line of development begins 
with Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis, and develops through Joshua 
Muravchik, and William Kristol and Robert Kagan.    
 
Those lines of thought and development intersect/ed with one another from time to time, 
especially through the Clinton era but did not fully cohere. Coherence and (objective) 
‘unity’ were forged by the terror attacks of 9-11, which unified conservative nationalists, 
neo-conservatives, and liberal interventionist hawks: rhetorically, promoting democracy 
took on a crusading form as the means to security and global ‘improvement’, regardless 
of political party, even though partisan and ideological lines continued to differentiate, at 
the margins, the various tendencies. 
 
Michael Doyle and the origins of DPT 
DPT has gained widespread acceptance in the academic community and spawned a 
productive “research program” (George and Bennett, 2005: 37-38). Going even further, 
Jack Levy calls DPT IR’s only  “empirical law” (Lepgold and Nincic, 2001: 113).6  
 
Though traceable to Kant, Montesquieu and American republican-federalists, there was a 
flurry of intellectual activity in regard to DPT’s development in the 1960s and 1970s. 
However, it was Michael Doyle who placed the issue firmly back on the academic 
agenda, with funding from the Ford Foundation from 1979-1982.7 The total Ford allotted 
to the project, “Support for Research on the Future of the International Economic Order”, 
was $409,735.8 Of that, $90,000 was granted to Doyle and Miles Kahler, for a study on 
North-South economic relations. The project included examination of the impact of 
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ideology on international economic relations. Doyle was also interested in testing foreign 
policy theories “that posit regular connections between state and society, interest and 
ideology, tradition and contemporary response, and systemic position and economic 
strategy.” The project emphasised the increasing levels of economic differentiation 
among Third World states and probable policy consequences. When the more developed 
Third World states, like Kenya, liberalised, they would begin to form a ‘party of liberty’.9 
The seeds of Doyle’s subsequent work on the “liberal peace” are clearly present in his 
Ford-funded project. The “party of liberty” on the world stage has re-appeared as the 
Concert of Democracies, as this paper argues below. Of course, there are other important 
sources of Doyle’s ideas on DPT and of their subsequent impact. For example, it is vital 
to recognise that Doyle’s initial overt foray into DPT was “serendipitous” – the need to 
address a student meeting at short notice, and try to say something interesting. It is also 
evident, however, that bringing the ideas to publication required space and time for which 
Doyle graciously expressed his appreciation to the Ford Foundation. For his later work on 
the matter, Doyle acknowledges his debt to the MacArthur Foundation.10  
 
Ahead of Doyle’s 1983 article/s, however, President Ronald Reagan had declared the 
inherently “peaceful” character of “liberal foreign policies” in a speech in London in 
1982 and, later established the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to promote 
democracy. The re-birth of “liberal peace theory” in its sophisticated sense was Doyle’s 
work; yet it was implicated also in the context of the aggressive anti-communism of the 
Reagan administration, providing an ominous warning about the uses of academic 
theories by policy-makers (Doyle, 1994: 98-101). Of course, Doyle’s DPT contained an 
appreciation of the “liberal peace” as well as a critique of “liberal imperialism”. 
Successive American presidents have taken aspects of DPT and used them for purposes 
unintended by its original authors. Undeniably, however, Doyle’s theory was located 
within a broadly liberal framework that placed emphasis on the idea that free markets 
were also sources of world peace (Doyle, 1986; Deudney, 2004). 
The Harvard-based, policy-oriented, journal, International Security played a key role in 
the development of the democratic peace by publishing a series of articles followed by a 
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reader in 1996.11 Maliniak et al note  that it is one of the twelve leading journals in the 
field and that security studies specialists are the keenest of IR scholars “to engage the 
policy community,” with 30- 60 percent of articles addressing policy issues, in contrast 
with 10 to 20 percent of such articles in other IR journals. International Security has 
consistently been among the top five most cited IR journals (Miller, 2001: fn16).  
International Security is the journal of Harvard’s policy-oriented (Belfer) Center for 
Science and International Affairs. The 1996 “reader” was part-funded by support from 
the Carnegie Corporation (Brown, Lynne-Jones and Miller, 1996)12 while the Belfer 
Center has long received support from the Ford Foundation.13 The Belfer Center, part of 
the Kennedy School of Government, funded by the Kennedy family, turned its attention 
to the “lessons of Vietnam” in the late 1960s, examining the mis-uses of history and 
historical analogies by national security managers.  
The Belfer Center continues to enjoy linkages with the Ford and other foundations. For 
instance, David Hamburg, former president of the Carnegie Corporation (CC) is a 
member of Belfer’s International Council. In 1997, the Carnegie Corporation granted 
$700,000 to the Belfer Center for work on “new concepts of international security and 
formulating policy recommendations…” CC emphasised the work of the Center in 
identifying the “conditions favorable to the ‘democratic peace’ hypothesis….. whether 
U.S. foreign policy should seek to promote democracy… [and] the hypothesis that many 
democratizing states undergo a volatile transition in which they tend to be relatively more 
likely to engage in war” (Carnegie Corporation, 2007).  The Center’s members include 
Robert Zoellick, president of the World Bank and former deputy secretary of state, 
William Perry, Clinton’s secretary of defense, historian Niall Ferguson, and General John 
Abizaid, commander of US central command. Paula Dobriansky, the Bush 
administration’s under secretary of state for democracy and global affairs, and a leading 
neo-conservative, joined Belfer as a senior fellow. With over 100 scholars and 
practitioners from the worlds of business, government and the military, a constant stream 
of prestigious publications and conferences, the Belfer Center is a university-based think 
tank that aims to “advance policy-relevant knowledge.”14   
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Promoting democracy occupied a key place in the pages of International Security in the 
1990s, especially because President Clinton “was an explicit believer in the democratic 
peace hypothesis” (Miller, 2001: 5; 12 ;13; 34; Clinton, 1994). The complementarity of 
theory and practice were made clear in Debating the Democratic Peace: “Apart from the 
theoretical debate…the democratic peace also has practical significance. If democracies 
never go to war with one another, then the best prescription for international peace may 
be to encourage the spread of democracy.… and expand the democratic zone of 
peace….” The theory, if wrong, however, could lead the US into “major wars and years 
of occupation….” (Brown et al, 1996: xiv). 
It was also in International Security that Snyder and Mansfield strengthened DPT and 
dampened the Clinton administration’s ardour for democracy promotion in the late 
1990s.15 Deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott indicated his familiarity with debates in 
International Security over the democratic peace and specifically of Mansfield and 
Snyder’s article (Talbott, 1996).16 Mansfield and Snyder noted that democratizing states 
are more likely to go to war than mature democracies, especially in the first decade. The 
lack of durable stabilising institutions in new democracies make it difficult to form stable 
coalitions. Mansfield and Snyder suggest that the West help promote pluralism through 
long-term engagement, minimizing the (Brown et al, 1996: xxvi) “dangers of the 
turbulent transition” (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995: 334). Their article was originally 
published in Foreign Affairs (May-June 1995) before its publication in International 
Security in its Summer 1995 issue, possibly its principal route to the Clinton 
administration (Wilson, 2000, 117).  
 
Mansfield and Snyder developed their arguments along the above lines by publishing 
From Voting to Violence in 2000, funded in part by Ford and Carnegie, among others, 
and Electing To Fight in 2005, supported by the Hoover Institution and the Belfer Center. 
Mansfield and Snyder argued for concrete steps to encourage the development of the rule 
of law, a neutral civil service, civil rights and professional media, ahead of the holding of 
elections in would-be democracies (Mansfield and Snyder, 2000: 41), shifting emphasis 
from democracy to stability. In 2005, criticizing the Bush administration’s crude 
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interpretation of the possibilities of DPT, Mansfield and Snyder implicitly complimented 
the Clinton administration’s more nuanced understanding of the opportunities, and 
dangers, of democratization (Owen, 2005). The authors argued that for democracy to 
succeed, it was necessary that such states go through sequenced development of the pre-
conditional bases of democracy (2005: 4). By 2007, Mansfield and Snyder were the 
subjects of criticism for being “optimists” about the prospects for sequenced 
democratization (Mansfield and Snyder, 2007:6). Despite criticism from some experts, 
this is arguably the more nuanced approach currently being pursued by the Obama 
administration (Obama, 2009a; McMahon, 2009). Mansfield and Snyder’s work has not 
rejected DPT: they have developed it along “realist” lines so as to make its 
implementation more effective (Owen, 2005).    
 
Other journals were also important in the development and discussion of DPT. World 
Politics published articles by Randall Schweller (1992), C.R. and M. Ember and Bruce 
Russett (1992), and John Oneal (1999). The Journal of Democracy  defended and 
promoted the implementation of DPT. For example, Morton Halperin (director, PPS at 
State, 1998–2001, and senior director for Democracy at the NSC,1994–96)  co-wrote 
articles on how the major powers increasingly were “guaranteeing democracy” where it 
was actively undermined (Halperin and Lomasney (1993; 1998), while political scientist 
James Lee Ray provided a robust theoretical and methodological defence of DPT (Ray, 
1997:50). 
 
Clearly, DPT became influential only after the Cold War – principally with the Clinton 
administration - and only after it had been legitimized by policy-oriented elite knowledge 
institutions. In the process of moving from academic theory to foreign policy, however, 
the ‘peace’ theory was ‘securitised’, though the precise degree of securitization depended 
on the politics of specific networks..  
 
Larry Diamond and the Clinton administration 
Diamond is a key figure in the migration of DPT from academia to policy-makers. An 
academic at Stanford, he has co-edited NED’s Journal of Democracy since 1990, closely 
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associated with the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) of the Democratic Party, and 
contributed an important study on democracy promotion to the Carnegie Commission on 
the Prevention of Deadly Violence in 1995. He is a leading member of the Council of the 
Community of Democracies. Finally, Diamond served the Bush administration in Iraq as 
a Senior Adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad (January to April 
2004).  
 
Diamond (1991) introduced DPT to the PPI and, through that, to the Clinton 
administration, with his report, An American Foreign Policy for Democracy, that 
enunciated the basic principles of DPT and extended the peace thesis to argue that 
democracies are more reliable as trading partners, offer more stable “climates for 
investment… honor international treaties…” Welcoming the end of the Cold War, 
Diamond argues that the United States had a golden opportunity “to reshape the world” 
(emphasis added) and transform US opinion from attachment to global “order and 
stability” to reshaping national sovereignty to enable American interventions abroad. 
With the collapse of Soviet socialism, Diamond emphasised America’s “scope to shape 
the political character of the entire world for generations.” (Emphasis added). Linking 
idealism with realism, Diamond claims that America’s own security is protected by 
democratising other nations, providing a strategically compelling reason to make 
democracy America’s mission, a viable alternative to President George HW Bush’s “New 
World Order”. The latter, Diamond argues was obsessed “with order, stability, and 
‘balance of power’ – often at the expense of freedom and self-determination…” Finally, 
Diamond argued that the US should form a new association of democracies to mobilize 
rapid action.  
 
Diamond’s PPI report had not appeared as a “bolt from the blue” to Democrats, however. 
The Clinton Democrats rolled out their orientations in 1990 and 1991: The New Orleans 
Declaration (of 1 March 1990) of the DLC by Governor Bill Clinton endorsed the DLC’s 
support for Jimmy Carter’s “commitment to human rights” and America’s need to 
“remain energetically engaged in the worldwide struggle for individual liberty, human 
rights, and prosperity…”;17 in May 1991, The New American Choice Resolution, as 
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adopted by the DLC in Cleveland, Ohio, strongly endorsed democracy promotion as a US 
national interest. Diamond’s unique contribution was to introduce DPT to Clintonite 
thinking. The PPI helped harness academic ideas to Clinton, shown by Clinton’s speech 
in December 1991 important parts of which appear to paraphrase Diamond’s PPI report.18 
But even more than Diamond, Clinton stressed the dangers of the “new security 
environment” in which to build on “freedom’s victory in the Cold War.”  
 
Clinton more sharply “securitized” DPT, dividing the world into democratic and 
autocratic zones, the latter as threat to the former. As Buger and Villumsen (2007: 433) 
argue, “Creating the certainty of democratic peace …increased the uncertainty about the 
relations between democratic and non-democratic states…. thinking in terms of a zone of 
democratic peace also created a vision of a ‘zone of turmoil’…” Clinton’s national 
security adviser, Tony Lake, noted in 1993, Americans should now “visualise our 
security mission as promoting the enlargement of the ‘blue areas’ [of the world] of 
market democracies.”19 Lake, who proclaimed Clinton’s foreign policy as “pragmatic 
neo-Wilsonianism” (Hyland, 1999: 23), overtly promoted enlargement as “the successor 
to a doctrine of containment,” the substitution of a defensive concept for an active and 
expansionist one (Lake, 1993). In the same securitising vein, deputy secretary of state 
Strobe Talbot noted that America operated in “The new geopolitics: defending 
democracy in the post-cold war era.”20 Joseph Kruzel notes DPT provided a pre-emptive 
strategy for national security, eliminating threats “by turning a country into a democracy” 
(1994, 180). In 1993, the future Senior Director for Democracy at the NSC, Morton 
Halperin, argued that “a true world order requires” American-style limited government, 
while the global community should embrace a “duty of interference in the internal affairs 
of a state…” to save democracy (Halperin et al, 1993: 60-64; emphasis added).    
 
It is important to note, however, that DPT needed additional ballast if its potential of 
global transformation was fully to be exploited by US national security managers. As 
Smith (2007) notes, democratic transition theory also had a role to play and Diamond 
merged the two approaches. The net effect is to argue with “certainty” that not only does 
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Diamond’s theoretical synthesis is exemplified in his work for the Carnegie Commission 
on Preventing Deadly Conflict. In December 1995, he published Promoting Democracy 
in the 1990s, suggesting that democratic transitions were propelled by political factors 
and need not be hamstrung by historic or “societal pre-conditions”. Diamond argued that 
instability in democratising states opened the way for intervention.21 Diamond suggested 
democratic states prioritise democratic transitions in countries of “importance… to their 
own security and to regional and global security more generally,” selecting countries for 
transition that could “serve as a … ‘beachhead’ for democratic development…” 
[emphasis added]. 
 
The Clinton Administration and the Community of Democracies  
The Clinton administrations worked actively to construct a “Community of 
Democracies”, along the lines indicated in Diamond’s PPI Report. Championed by 
secretary of state Madeleine Albright, a Council for the Community of Democracies 
(CCD) was founded in 2000, in Warsaw, continuing a process of dividing the world into 
zones of democratic peace and the rest, and increasingly hardening the boundaries as a 
precursor to greater pressure on some powers to democratise. The CCD was especially 
interested in engaging with nations that were in danger of back-sliding on democracy 
during the “turbulent transition” that had been identified by Mansfield and Snyder 
(1995). As a result, CCD developed a number of regional groupings of democracies and a 
Democracy Caucus at the United Nations. It is very much an American enterprise that is 
funded from numerous sources, including the US Department of State and the 
Rockefeller Foundation.22 
 
The Wilsonian origins of the work of the CCD have explicitly been stated by State 
Department representatives who, by 2000, were “focusing on making democracy the key 
to safety, security, cooperation and human rights.” (Emphasis added). Explicitly building 
on DPT’s broad conclusions, assistant secretary of state Koh wanted to build “a caucus of 
democratic countries who are capable of responding when democratic norms are 
threatened…”,23 a message underlined by Paula Dobriansky, a member of the hawkish 
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Project for the New American Century (PNAC). Dobriansky divided the world into 
“solid” and “emerging democracies”, followed by “offenders” against whom democracies 
should “band… together to exert some pressure….”24 The principal difference between 
CCD and PNAC, however, turned on their respective assessment on the precise mix of 
coercion and diplomacy to be applied in promoting democracy. 
 
The coincidence of the Cold War’s end with the rise of Bill Clinton’s presidential 
ambitions presented an opportunity for DPT – via scholar-activists like Diamond – to go 
straight from opposition platforms to policy-making circles. In its migration from 
academia to the state, however, DPT became militarised: words like “threat”, “national 
security”, “zones of peace” and “zones of turmoil” became increasingly associated with 
“peace” theory. 
 
Democracy promotion and the Neoconservatives 
Francis Fukuyama provided some philosophical ‘depth’ to the neoconservative 
persuasion with his “The End of History?” article in National Interest magazine (1989)25 
and book (1992) of the same title taking the first major steps towards neo-conservatives’ 
embrace of democracy promotion. At the time of his article, Fukuyama was deputy 
director of the State Department’s policy planning staff – the administration’s foreign 
policy think tank (Hill, 1994: 19). In his article, Fukuyama notes “The triumph of the 
West, of the Western idea…” and the disappearance of alternatives. While critics – such 
as Realists – suggest that power politics will continue to dominate post-communist world 
affairs, Fukuyama argues that national interests are based mainly on ideological factors. 
In practice, war is now unlikely among the advanced democracies. Conflict, however, 
would still occur as the world remained divided between historical and post-historical 
states. 
 
In his book, Fukuyama (1992: 220) further elaborated on his ideas related to the 
democratic peace (citing Doyle’s work, and Kant’s, but clearly advancing beyond the 
former’s warnings about the imperial dangers of resurgent liberalism) and, equally 
interestingly, on how effective democratic transitions came about, echoing Diamond, 
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suggesting that leadership was the most important factor in determining transitions to 
democracy (1992: 222). Emphasising the revolutionary character of American power, 
Fukuyama envisaged suspicious, parallel and occasionally conflicting relations between 
nations “stuck in history” and the advanced liberal powers, especially over oil, 
immigration, and non-democratic states with weapons of mass destruction. “Force will 
continue to be the ultima ratio in their [historical/post-historical nations’) mutual 
relations.” (277-279). 
 
International organisation is vital to that effort, Fukuyama (1992) continues: a (non) 
Kantian “international league of democracies” more like NATO than the United Nations, 
however. That is, Fukuyama embraces the idea of an armed league of (liberal) 
democracies to thwart “threats arising from the non-democratic part of the world” (282-
3), even more overtly securitising DPT than the Clinton administration. NATO as a 
global alliance of democracies was promoted by the Clinton administration in the 1990s 
(Talbott, 1995) and is now championed by Ivo Daalder, President Obama’s ambassador 
to NATO (Daalder and Goldeiger, 2006; NATO, 2010).1 
 
Following Fukuyama, Joshua Muravchik of the American Enterprise Institute, and 
William Kristol and Robert Kagan, further promoted the morality of spreading 
democracy and intervening forcefully to halt humanitarian crises (Halper and Clarke, 
2004). However, they favoured democracy promotion and humanitarian intervention on a 
case-by-case basis, rather than as a general principle of US foreign policy. Though 
Kristol and Kagan (1996: 27) argued that America’s “moral goals and its fundamental 
national interests are almost always in harmony,” they recognised that the United States 
had a range of powers through which its influence worked to better secure her against 
threats: “The purpose was not Wilsonian idealistic whimsy” but securing American 
power and asserting its greatness. Fukuyama (2007-08: 33-34; 29), despite his drift away 
from neoconservatism, argues that pragmatic democracy promotion by the United States 
improves America’s global image and its international influence. The evidence above in 
regard to the Clinton era, however, suggests that though the neoconservatives were more 
                                                 
1
 NATO’s new strategic concept was developed by an expert group chaired by Madeleine Albright. 
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strident in language and style, they hardly differed from liberal internationalists in the 
1990s. 
 
The end of the Cold War created a demand for ‘new thinking’ that influenced the Clinton 
administration (Jentleson, 2000). Democracy promotion, boosted by intellectual support 
from DPT, became the preferred orientation of the Clinton administration, although in a 
securitised form. The role of Doyle, the Belfer Center and International Security, as well 
as Larry Diamond and the PPI, were of central importance during the 1990s in securing 
the place of DPT in foreign policy discourse and action. This is further seen by the 
temporary withdrawal from overly optimistic versions of DPT in the second Clinton 
administration with the inauguration of ‘democratic engagement’, prompted by the work 
of Mansfield and Snyder. However, this merely endorsed a more aggressive democracy-
consolidation programme as suggested by Mansfield and Snyder, whose research 
findings – published for the Belfer Center by MIT Press - indicated that the conditions for 
successful democratization included US assistance to build a multiparty system and a 
vigorous free press, among other things (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005). Relatedly, the 
expansion of NATO as a global alliance of democracies, underpinned by DPT, also 
shows the influence of the theory, and its securitisation. According to Strobe Talbott, 
candidates for NATO membership needed to demonstrate “the strength of their 
democratic institutions”, and willingness to confront “new threats”. The very prospect of 
NATO membership would act as a catalyst to democratic reform and economic 
liberalisation, and contribute to the peaceful resolution of disputes and general stability 
(Talbott, 1995; NATO, 2010). 
 
Further to the political-ideological right, Fukuyama’s championing of DPT set in train a 
movement among neoconservatives more militantly and aggressively to pursue DPT to 
its’ logical’ conclusion: forcible regime change. Interestingly, groups such as PNAC were 
actively engaged with Clinton’s Pentagon by 2000, while Fukuyama became prominent 
in the Princeton Project on National Security, headed by John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, as well as Tony Lake and George Shultz (Parmar, 2009). 
 
 21 
The evidence shows the conceptual, symbolic and instrumental influence of DPT. 
Conceptually, from Clinton to the neoconservatives, there occurred a change in the 
purposes and rhetorical justifications of American power. America’s liberal values and its 
national security interests were unified by DPT. Symbolically, DPT legitimised American 
preponderance in a world made dangerous by rogue and terrorist states. Intervening 
against such regimes further secured America’s self-image as a good state while 
maintaining powerful armed forces and increasing military budgets at near Cold War 
levels, and heading off demands for a “peace dividend”. The instrumental influence of 
DPT is seen in the Clinton era and, perhaps, most clearly, in the post-9-11 Bush doctrine 
and the war on Iraq that followed. 
 
This is much tidier than what actually occurred, however. DPT was initially ignored. 
Later, its influence ebbed and flowed; it had its triumphalists and critics; there were 
competing paradigms. Its influence relied on a combination of unforeseen shocks and 
powerful networks that both promoted and refined the theory. Jentleson shows it took a 
specific mindset – that of a former policy planner and college professor, Tony Lake, as 
opposed to the lawyerly secretary of state, Warren Christopher – to concretise Clinton’s 
espousal of “almost pure Kantianism” in his 1994 State of the Union address (Jentleson, 
2000:141). Yet, it has continued to exert influence regardless of the party in power.   
 
The activities of the three networks were organisationally separate in many respects but 
were effectively part of an emergent belief in the national security benefits and American 
power justifications of democracy promotion in the 1990s. The three networks would 
never be fully unified in a single organization, but they moved closer together in the wake 
of another catalytic event, 9-11, that demanded ‘new thinking’ and ‘muscular’ responses. 
ROLE OF 9-11 IN ‘FUSING’ NEO-CONSERVATIVES, LIBERAL 
INTERNATIONALISTS, AND CONSERVATIVE NATIONALISTS 
According to Wolfson (2004) and Abelson (2006: 216), the democracy-promotion views 
of Kagan, Kristol et al made surprisingly little impression on George W. Bush in 2000, 
but did on Clinton’s Pentagon team. After 9-11, however, things changed (Wolfson, 
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2004). Drezner (2008) similarly argues that after 9-11, “Neoconservative ideas – 
particularly democracy promotion – were placed at the heart of the Bush administration’s 
grand strategy.”  
By 2005, the Bush administration had embedded a version of DPT in its national security 
strategy and (post-facto) justified the Iraq War on that basis (Owen IV, 2005). Even the 
erstwhile realist secretary of state, Condoleeza Rice, proclaimed with gusto “The Promise 
of a Democratic Peace” in which violence between advanced states was “unthinkable” 
and the principal threats incubated in “weak and failing states”. Rice justified democracy 
promotion as the most realistic option, combining optimism/idealism with “sound 
strategic logic.”26 Previously, Paula Dobriansky (2003), the-then under-secretary of state 
for democracy and global affairs, argued that idealism and realism were the bedrocks of 
Bush foreign policy, that although democracy and security concerns had always to be 
balanced against each other, they were also intimately related. The fight against al Qaeda, 
she argued, successfully combined security and democracy-promotion concerns. In 
Bush’s second inauguration speech, he declared that “The survival of liberty in our land 
increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands…. America’s vital interests 
and our deepest beliefs are now one.” (Emphasis added). 
Kagan (2007) champions a “global concert or league of democratic states” to 
“complement, not replace, the United Nations, the G-8, and other global forums.” Kagan 
was a close foreign policy adviser to defeated Republican presidential candidate, Senator 
John McCain, who declared his support for a “league of democracies” in early 2008.27 
McCain’s league of democracies is an echo of the “concert of democracies” promoted by 
liberal internationalist John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter’s Princeton Project on 
National Security (2006). Brookings’ Ivo Daalder is a convert, and was an election 
campaign foreign policy advisor to candidate Barack Obama, the latter advocating a  
“Rapid Response Fund for young democracies” in March 2008 (McMahon, 2009: 37). 
Daalder was appointed President Obama’s ambassador to NATO, an organisation touted 
as a ‘global democratic alliance’ by many, including PPI’s Will Marshall (Marshall, 
2009). Slaughter headed the State Department’s policy planning staff; other democracy-
promoters in the Obama administration include Samantha Power, Susan Rice, Michael 
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McFaul, and Philip Gordon. Vice President Joe Biden was long the voice of the PPI in 
the US Senate.  Space prohibits discussion of the details of the Concert of Democracies 
but there are definite similarities between the latter and Clarence Streit’s Federal Union 
of the Democracies of the North Atlantic organisation of the late 1930s and early 1940s. 
Instructively, Streit’s organisation, which called for a federal union of democracies to 
save western civilisation, is cited as an aspiration for the West after 1989 by Deudney 
and Ikenberry in an essay entitled “Wither the West?”28 There is an active Streit Council 
for a Union of Democracies (SCUD), based in Washington, DC, that holds regular 
conferences and seminars. Interestingly, in 1978, Board members of Federal Union 
formed the Committee (now, the Council) for a Community of Democracies, later 
endorsed by Madeleine Albright, as shown in the Clinton section above. Smith (2007: 
108) argues that such associations of democracy initiatives, based on the academic 
legitimacy of DPT have become “a claim to cultural superiority and an encouragement to 
belligerent behavior – an update of race theory.” The Obama administration has 
committed itself to strengthening the Community of Democracies (McMahon, 2009; 
Allen, 2009) in order more consensually to support democratization. The concert of 
democracies is central to foreign policy elites’ discourse in the United States, pivotal in 
“ratifying the democratic peace”, and in hardening conceptually and institutionally the 
boundaries between the liberal democratic and non-democratic worlds (Ikenberry and 
Slaughter, 2006: 25). 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has shown that knowledge networks are a vital aspect of power in the United 
States, managing to elaborate and mobilise a “peace” theory that ultimately was 
transformed into a technology of aggressive ‘democracy’ promotion/imposition within a 
threat-oriented and threat-confronting policy-orientation. The confident public rhetoric 
inspired by the theory played a key role in justifying the Iraq War. 
 
What would US foreign policy have looked like without DPT? Certainly, neo-
Wilsonianism would still have been available to Clintonites and, therefore, democracy 
promotion. But in an uncertain post-Cold War world, the social scientific ‘certainties’ 
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promised by DPT – with all the hallmarks of scholarly legitimacy, relative simplicity of 
its underlying thesis and the marketability of spreading/defending democracy, and 
thereby dealing with the ‘Vietnam syndrome’ – proved decisive. The fact that there was 
support for DPT from across the political spectrum made its adoption more likely. 
Without DPT – which could operate either unilaterally or multilaterally, peacefully or 
coercively – US foreign policy might not have a concept that could cohere its identity, or 
supply it a value-free, scientific post-Soviet era rationale. From the intellectual 
straitjacket of Cold War containment mentalities in which almost anything could be 
justified if it diminished Soviet influence, DPT offered a scientifically proven and easily 
comprehended “law” of international behaviour: from then on, it would be the ‘truth’in 
the service of democracy that would drive US national security rather than convenient 
truths to undermine communism.   
 
The paper also shows that despite the relatively distinct sources of the theory and its 
reasonably distinct lines of development, there was always a certain level of objective, if 
not subjective or personal, ‘unity’ and coherence in the underlying motivation of the 
actors and institutions: a sense that US power is a force for good, that responsibility 
comes with power, and a sense of America’s mission.  
 
This sense of shared mission of American global responsibility – actually an imperial 
creed (Barnett, 1973: 19) – was strengthened in practical terms by a vitally important 
(effective but not intentional) specialisation of functions or a division of labour among 
the key organisations of the knowledge network. As Brown argues, there are truth-
seekers and engineers; but there are also mediating organisations or hybrids (such as 
Belfer, a university-based policy-oriented think tank, that are composed of both groups). 
Inside the network, there are key nodes between which there are overlaps and interlocks 
such as universities, journals (International Security; National Interest; Journal of 
Democracy; Foreign Affairs), think tanks (CFR, PPNS, CCD, Brookings, PPI), 
foundations (Ford, Carnegie, MacArthur). There is a revolving door among many of the 
organisations due to a widespread belief that US power is a force for good, its values 
universal and transferable, the defender against threats. This has fostered intellectual 
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capital production through a sense of a shared mission among like-minded but differently 
positioned and qualified individuals. 
 
The knowledge ecology is diverse and tends to pivot on the balance between “spontaneity 
and structure” – a balance between space for creativity within a structure of goals related 
to a mission i.e., US power. Therefore, milieu are fostered that encourage creativity and 
innovation. To some extent, universities provide loose structures for spontaneity – the 
space for curiosity to be pursued and for unexpected discoveries and insights. Doyle’s 
insights were a spin-off from an unanticipated student event, a Ford-funded scholarly 
study of international (North-South) economic relations, and the time that grant bought to 
write up and publish new ideas, an ‘accidental’ by-product of the space for curiosity to 
follow its own course. Yet, the ‘success’ of DPT was in large part dependent on the 
relatively agile structures composed of the Belfer Center at Harvard and its Ford-funded 
journal, International Security which, at that time, was not a peer reviewed journal and, 
therefore, better able to set its own agenda.29 The production and elaboration of DPT in 
the universities was also predicated on funding from liberal internationalist foundations 
like Ford and Carnegie, a further unifying factor (Berman, 1983).30 The status bestowed 
upon DPT by its ‘adoption’ by Belfer and International Security, as recognised by the 
Carnegie Corporation, both further elevated the standing of Doyle in the scholarly 
community but also brought policy-community recognition, adding to his credentials. 
This suggests that there is a key element of knowledge networks that is social: a social 
process of ideas’ acceptance due to their elitist and therefore respectable provenance, 
based on credible, i.e., widely accepted theoretical and methodological bases, which 
gains positive responses from other scholars, policy entrepreneurs (think tanks, 
foundations, opposition party) and policy-makers (Clinton, Albright, Bush, Obama). 
Acceptance by policymakers feeds back to scholars and scholar-activists, encouraging 
them further to continue working on and refining the theory, with the promise that their 
ideas might be taken seriously and, in turn, scholars stood to gain recognition and 
prestige through ‘knowledge transfer’ and also, therefore, further foundation-funding. 
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Propelled by curiosity in its earliest forms, DPT became politically viable and 
conceptually and instrumentally influential principally because of catalytic events: the 
sudden cessation of the Cold War and the crisis in foreign policy thinking that ensued 
provided a permissive environment for ‘new’ thinking. The theory’s refinement and 
mobilisation led to its adoption in the 1990s by differing tendencies – liberal hawks and 
neoconservatives - and, most importantly, its securitisation – that is, “peace” theory was 
truncated and transmutated into a vital policy technology to confront external threats 
from non-democratic/rogue/failing/ and failed states by military and other coercive 
means. Designating zones of peace simultaneously delineated zones of turmoil, defining 
the latter as a threat to the former, redrawing intellectual maps (Wilson, 2000: 122). 
Liberal hawks and neocons alike were involved in this transformative process. The latter 
were joined after another catalytic event - 9-11 - by conservative nationalists who went 
on to justify the Bush doctrine in part by democratic peace theory. The Iraq War of 2003, 
and the failure to suppress quickly resistance to the US occupation, created a “crisis” 
seized upon by the bi-partisan Princeton Project on National Security. PPNS advanced 
their own version of DPT proposed for use to confront threats to security through 
democracy promotion and military intervention, among other things. According to 
Ikenberry and Slaughter (2006: 11; 16), as “the world seems a more menacing place than 
ever”,  “it means safeguarding our alliances and promoting security cooperation among 
liberal democracies, ensuring the safety of Americans abroad as well as at home, 
avoiding the emergence of hostile great powers or balancing coalitions against the 
United States, and encouraging liberal democracy and responsible government 
worldwide.” The weight here rests a little more on developing ‘liberal’ institutions and, 
perhaps, leaving the ‘democracy’ till later; sequenced political development, in Mansfield 
and Snyder’s terms. Interestingly, PPNS was led by Clinton’s former national security 
adviser Tony Lake and Reagan’s former secretary of state, George Shultz; Francis 
Fukuyama was a key figure on the Project’s steering committee. A liberal hawk, a 
conservative nationalist and a neoconservative: a perfect example of post-9-11 fusion. 
Democracy promotion based on democratic peace theory is now effectively a non-issue 
as both main political parties have adopted it, and the Obama administration is continuing 
to champion it in Iraq and, indeed, seeking to extend the strategy to Afghanistan and 
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elsewhere. Obama stridently reiterated his commitment to democracy promotion, the 
universality of democratic principles, and the greater levels of security, stability and 
success of democratic states (Obama, 2009b).31 
 
The final point to be made is that democratic peace theory is an easy theory to promote in 
the United States given the deeply-held character of democratic values. It has great 
symbolic resonance and reaffirms positive ideas about American national identity and as 
a force for doing good in world affairs. It also serves as an excellent rationalizing device 
for Establishment forces that wish to promote the consolidation of American power using 
the cover of promoting democracy and eliminating brutal dictatorships. That is, 
democratic peace theory exercises symbolic influence, a new legitimating rhetoric for 
American hegemony.  
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